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1227 
A Solution to Utah’s Non-Compete Dilemma: 
Soliciting the Use of Non-Solicitation Agreements 
Utah has become a hub for company growth and innovation, 
especially in an area known as the “Silicon Slopes.” Well-known 
companies, like Qualtrics, Adobe, and eBay, have offices along the 
Wasatch Front. With such newfound relevance in the business 
community, it may seem odd that Utah’s legislature recently passed the 
Post-Employment Restrictions Act, which some say threatens Utah’s 
position as a state where businesses thrive. The Act restricts non-compete 
agreements to periods not greater than one year and automatically 
penalizes, through attorney’s fees and costs, any employer who tries to 
enforce a non-compete agreement that a court later finds unenforceable 
for any reason. The attorney’s fees penalty is particularly troubling for 
employers because Utah’s common law, which the Act did not affect 
aside from time restrictions, is difficult to navigate when drafting non-
compete agreements. The most problematic common-law elements for 
employers to meet include whether the non-compete agreement is 
necessary to protect goodwill and whether the agreement’s geographic 
scope is reasonable. Misinterpreting these common-law elements could 
prove extremely costly to employers. This Comment puts forth a solution 
for employers who want to protect their investment in employee 
training, proprietary and confidential information, and goodwill, but 
who are wary of being penalized because a court may find its non-
compete agreement unenforceable. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the end of the Great Recession, Utah has become a state 
famous for its slopes—the “Silicon Slopes.”1 The name derives from 
California’s famous Silicon Valley, an area near San Francisco that is a 
hub for technological innovation.2 Utah’s Silicon Slopes stretches 
from Utah County north along the Wasatch Front and includes 
 
 1.  See Gary R. Herbert, Technology’s New Home Located in ‘Silicon Slopes,’ Utah, 
CNBC (July 9, 2013, 10:59 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/100860405. 
 2.  Id. 
5.ROBBINS_FIN.NO HEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/12/2018  10:50 AM 
1227 A Solution to Utah’s Non-Compete Dilemma 
 1229 
several well-known businesses, such as Adobe, Intel, Qualtrics, 
Boeing, Vivint, DOMO, and eBay.3 Silicon Slopes’ software, medical 
device, and other startup companies drew over $700 million in 
venture capital funding during 2015.4 Several factors have bolstered 
this growth, including religious influences,5 friendly corporate taxes,6 
high quality of life,7 low cost of living,8 an educated workforce,9 and 
a business-friendly environment.10 
 
 3.  See id.; Andrew Zaleski, A High-Tech Mecca Rises to Rival Silicon Valley, CNBC, 
http://www.cnbc.com/2016/07/13/a-high-tech-mecca-rises-to-rival-silicon-valley.html (last 
updated July 14, 2016, 7:54 AM). 
 4.  Zaleski, supra note 3. 
 5.  Id. (“The [Mormon] religion’s influence in the state has helped concentrate 
entrepreneurial talent, since graduates aren’t inclined to move far from where they have grown 
up. And while a culture that emphasizes family life over business priorities . . . creates some 
conflict in the fast-paced world of tech, entrepreneurs and start-up boosters said the Mormon 
Church is a great proving ground for would-be tech founders.”). 
 6.  Herbert, supra note 1 (“Our tax policy takes a no-surprises approach. We haven’t 
increased corporate taxes for 15 years.”). Since Governor Herbert’s article was written, the 
Utah corporate franchise tax has remained at five percent. UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-7-104 
(West 2008). 
 7.  Mark Saal, Utah Leads the Country in Tech Sector Growth, STANDARD-EXAMINER 
(Aug. 31, 2016, 7:00 AM), http://www.standard.net/Business/2016/08/31/Utah-leads-
the-country-in-tech-sector-growth (“For many millennials, quality of life is a big issue. Being 
20 minutes from a ski resort, or 15 minutes from a mountain biking trail, is important 
to them.”). 
 8.  Tanner Christensen, Why the Silicon Slopes Are Just Warming Up, INC. (May 
18,  2016), http://www.inc.com/tanner-christensen/why-the-silicon-slopes-are-just-warming 
-up.html. 
 9.  See Ellen Rosen, Unicorns Help Put Utah’s ‘Silicon Slopes’ on the Tech Map, SEATTLE 
TIMES, https://www.seattletimes.com/business/unicorns-help-put-utahs-silicon-slopes-on-th 
e-tech-map/ (last updated Oct. 16, 2017, 7:46 PM) (“The local universities have played an 
important role in fostering homegrown talent. Brigham Young, the private university affiliated 
with the Mormon church, and the public University of Utah have programs intended to 
develop young entrepreneurs.”). 
 10.  Zaleski, supra note 3. Notwithstanding these growth factors, commentators suggest 
that some factors have slowed this growth from what it could be, especially in regard to 
drawing outside talent into the state. See Sara Jarman, Silicon Slopes is Rebranding Utah, KSL 
(July 14, 2016, 12:44 PM), http://www.ksl.com/?sid=40641324&nid=1012&title=silicon-
slopes-is-rebranding-utah (suggesting that Utah’s alcohol laws “scare[] people away” and that 
outsiders’ perspectives make it harder to attract people to Utah). Tech companies are also 
worried that infrastructure woes may derail growth. See Lee Davidson, Lehi, High-Tech 
Companies Say Utah Owes Them Better Highway, Train Line, SALT LAKE TRIBUNE (July 20, 
2015, 8:09 AM), http://www.sltrib.com/home/2738453-155/lehis-high-tech-company-say 
s-utah-owes. These negative factors likely will have even less of an impact on industry growth 
 
5.ROBBINS_FIN.NO HEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/12/2018  10:50 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2017 
1230 
However, some of these same employers have expressed concern 
that by recently enacting the Post-Employment Restrictions Act (the 
“Act”), Utah’s legislature may have harmed the businesses it is 
trying to attract.11 The Act primarily serves two functions: (1) it 
limits the duration of non-compete agreements entered into on or 
after May 10, 2016, to one year, excluding severance agreements and 
non-compete agreements arising from a business sale, and (2) it 
automatically requires employers to pay costs and attorney’s fees, 
along with actual damages, if a court finds an employer’s non-
compete agreement unenforceable.12 The overall effect on businesses 
remains to be seen13 as the law continues to take hold in the 
economy and the courts, but these two functions will likely affect 
employers in at least two major ways. 
First, although the effect of the duration limitation on employers 
is unclear,14 employers may perceive the Act’s one-year provision as a 
threat to their control over the dissemination of their confidential 
information.15 Additionally, the Act may disincentivize employers 
 
in the future as startup and technology businesses continue to grow. See Jarman, supra (“It is 
becoming easier to get people out here, though. As we build up the tech and startup scene 
more, this aspect combined with the quality of life we can offer, it’s possible.”). 
 11.  See generally CICERO, UTAH NON-COMPETE AGREEMENT RESEARCH (2017), https 
://issuu.com/saltlakechamber/docs/utah_non-compete_agreement_research (finding that 
employers generally believe non-compete agreements should be allowed because they protect 
employer interests, and only twenty-nine percent of employers surveyed agree that a time 
restriction of less than one year is adequate). 
 12.  See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 34-51-101 to -301 (West Supp. 2017). 
 13.  One survey, commissioned by the Utah State Legislature and conducted after the 
Act’s passage, concluded that “[t]he majority of Employers and Employees were unaware that 
Utah passed [the Act] in 2016.” CICERO, supra note 11, at 27. This indicates that an employer 
may not recognize the impact the Act may have on the enforceability of its non-compete 
agreements until it attempts to enforce an otherwise unenforceable agreement.  
 14.  This Comment does not attempt to speculate about the one-year restriction’s 
overall effect on Utah businesses. It addresses the restriction to introduce and give background 
to the Act and to explain how the restriction introduces some clarity into the confusing 
common-law landscape of enforceable non-compete agreements. 
 15.  See Lisa Petersen & Judson Stelter, Michael Best & Friedrich, Op-ed: Non-Compete 
Clauses Help Utah Companies Grow Their Businesses, SALT LAKE TRIBUNE (March 2, 2016, 
4:51 PM), http://archive.sltrib.com/article.php?id=3586305&itype=CMSID (“[I]f an 
employer cannot prevent an employee from working for a competitor for a reasonable time, 
there is little doubt that the former employee will inevitably share confidential information 
with his or her new employer or in his or her new business, even if the employee is technically 
prohibited from doing so.”); see also CICERO, supra note 11, at 58 (“69% percent of Employers 
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from investing in employee development because banning longer 
non-compete agreements may significantly increase employee 
mobility.16 Some disagree and argue that non-compete agreements 
hurt employers because the agreements actually obstruct employee 
mobility, which then hinders innovation in a fast-paced information 
society.17 Regardless, the majority of legal scholars agree that the 
limits non-compete agreements place on an employee’s freedom to 
choose his or her employer outweigh the effects on employers.18 
Second,19 and more important to the focus of this Comment, the 
Act’s automatic award of attorney’s fees and costs to the employee 
clearly has negative implications for businesses.20 Importantly, the 
Act does not state specific situations when the covenant is 
unenforceable, but instead dictates only that employers are liable for 
attorney’s fees and costs if the covenant is unenforceable—for any 
reason.21 Thus, an employer may be liable for attorney’s fees if its 
non-compete agreement satisfies the one-year requirement of the 
 
believe [the Act] will have a negative impact on their ability to protect proprietary ideas, 
inventions, or processes.”). 
 16.  See Rachel Arnow-Richman, Noncompetes, Human Capital, and Contract 
Formation: What Employment Law Can Learn from Family Law, 10 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 
155, 158–59 (2003) (discussing how employers are now dependent on human capital and how 
that dependency makes employers vulnerable to employee mobility). 
 17.  See Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial 
Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 603 
(1999) (“The widespread use and enforcement of covenants not to compete slow down high 
velocity employment to the point where the level of knowledge spillovers is too low to support 
a districtwide innovation cycle.”). 
 18.  See ORLY LOBEL, TALENT WANTS TO BE FREE: WHY WE SHOULD LEARN TO LOVE 
LEAKS, RAIDS, AND FREE RIDING 37 (2013) (“But by far the majority of the commentators 
are concerned . . . that the enforceability of noncompetes from a fairness perspective limits 
employees’ right to work and to freely choose their employer.”); Phillip J. Closius & Henry M. 
Schaffer, Involuntary Nonservitude: The Current Judicial Enforcement of Employee Covenants 
Not to Compete—A Proposal for Reform, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 531, 539–40 (1984) (“Courts—
and many legislatures—disfavor restraints of trade and, consequently, courts tend to construe 
covenants not to compete against the principal seeking its enforcement.”). 
 19.  This Comment will primarily focus on this second aspect of the Act because of its 
clear implications for Utah businesses. 
 20.  UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-51-301 (West Supp. 2017) (discussing an automatic award 
of attorney’s fees “[i]f an employer seeks to enforce a post-employment restrictive covenant 
[defined as a non-compete agreement] through arbitration or by filing a civil action and it is 
determined that the post-employment restrictive covenant is unenforceable”). 
 21.  Id. 
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Act but violates  even one common-law requirement, to which 
determining compliance is often difficult.22 
This Comment does not purport to argue that non-compete 
agreements in general are constructive or destructive for Utah 
businesses. However, this Comment does contend that the Act 
damages Utah businesses because it imposes automatic liability for 
attorney’s fees on employers who make good-faith efforts to comply 
with a confusing common law landscape but are found deficient. 
This Comment first provides an overview of the methods and 
reasoning behind non-compete agreements. Then it examines the 
current state of the law in Utah regarding non-compete agreements, 
including both the common law landscape and the Act. Finally, this 
Comment proposes a possible solution for employers who want to 
protect their interests in company goodwill, employee training, and 
confidential information but worry about automatic liability for 
attorney’s fees. 
II. NON-COMPETE AGREEMENTS: THEIR USE, BENEFITS, 
AND DRAWBACKS 
Non-compete agreements, first established over 500 years ago in 
England,23 spread in popularity in the United States during the 
Industrial Revolution.24 The agreement “typically provides that the 
employee shall not work for a competitor or set up a competitive 
business for himself [or herself] for a specified period of time in a 
 
 22.  See infra Part III; see also Arthur Murray Dance Studios v. Witter, 105 N.E.2d 685, 
687 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1952) (discussing non-compete common law as “a sea—vast and 
vacillating, overlapping and bewildering. One can fish out of it any kind of strange support for 
anything, if he [or she] lives so long”). 
 23.  Hui Shangguan, A Comparative Study of Non-Compete Agreements for Trade Secret 
Protection in the United States and China, 11 WASH. J. L. TECH. & ARTS 405, 409 (2016). 
 24.  Id. at 409–10. Often, technology, sales, and managerial employees are required to 
sign a non-compete agreement as a condition to employment. Harlan M. Blake, Employee 
Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625, 625–26 (1960). Currently, “18 percent, or 
30 million, American workers are . . . covered by non-compete agreements.” WHITE HOUSE, 
NON-COMPETE AGREEMENTS: ANALYSIS OF THE USAGE, POTENTIAL ISSUES, AND STATE 
RESPONSES 3 (2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/non-comp 
etes_report_final2.pdf. In one study, approximately 17.85% of Utah employees were currently 
covered by non-compete agreements, and nearly half of Utah employers reported using non-
compete agreements. CICERO, supra note 11, at 12–13.  
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designated geographical area.”25 Employers usually enforce non-
compete agreements at the state level, with statutes and common law 
governing the boundaries of the agreements.26 
This Part examines the benefits to the employer and drawbacks 
to the employee of using non-compete agreements, a useful analysis 
when determining their value in light of the fees and cost obligations 
that the Act imposes. This Part will then briefly discuss the ways 
other states regulate non-compete agreements to contextualize 
Utah’s recent Act within a national framework. 
A. The Benefits and Drawbacks of Non-Compete Agreements in 
Employer-Employee Relationships 
1. Benefits to employers 
Recently, more and more employees no longer see themselves as 
restricted to climbing one particular corporate ladder; rather, a 
decline in manufacturing trades and a rise in information-dependent 
industries has led to increased employee mobility within different 
industries.27 For employers, any advantages of increased employee 
mobility, such as an increased talent pool of employees, is likely 
countered by the risk of losing current employees, whose skills are 
the employers’ “most valuable assets.”28 Four main reasons explain 
why employers utilize non-compete agreements to combat this new 
trend. Each will be discussed below. 
a. Non-compete agreements protect an employer’s trade secrets.29 
Trade secrets include any “business information that is kept 
confidential to maintain an advantage over competitors.”30 
 
 25.  Blake, supra note 24, at 626. 
 26.  Shangguan, supra note 23, at 410. 
 27.  Arnow-Richman, supra note 16, at 157; Matt Marx, The Firm Strikes Back: Non-
Compete Agreements and the Mobility of Technical Professionals, 76 AM. SOC. REV. 695, 
695 (2011). 
 28.  See Marx, supra note 27, at 696. 
 29.  See Stuart C. Irby Co. v. Tipton, 796 F.3d 918, 924 (8th Cir. 2015). 
 30.  Trade Secret, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). Additionally, the 
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition defines “trade secret” as “any information that can 
be used in the operation of a business or other enterprise and that is sufficiently valuable and 
secret to afford an actual or potential economic advantage over others.” RESTATEMENT 
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Protecting an employer’s trade secrets has been deemed “[t]he main 
economic and societally beneficial use[] of non-competes,”31 likely 
because trade secrets have independent, economic value that 
depends in pertinent part on their confidentiality.32 
However, employers frequently use non-compete agreements 
even if protecting trade secrets is not obviously a legitimate goal. 
Those situations include jobs in which employees do not need four-
year college degrees or earn significant compensation.33 Because 
almost thirty percent of non-compete agreements occur in situations 
in which trade secret protection is likely inapplicable,34 trade secret 
protection alone cannot justify employers’ growing use of non-
compete agreements.35 
b. Non-compete agreements promote an employer’s goodwill.36 An 
employer’s goodwill is defined as  
 
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (AM. LAW INST. 1995). By these definitions, “trade 
secrets” also includes customer lists because customer lists are often confidential and obviously 
valuable to the company. As such, customer lists are expressly included in this discussion of 
trade secrets. 
 31.  WHITE HOUSE, supra note 24, at 4. 
 32.  See Trade Secret, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 33.  See WHITE HOUSE, supra note 24, at 4 (“If protection of trade secrets were the 
main explanation for non-compete agreements, then one would expect such agreements to be 
highly concentrated among workers with advanced education and occupations entrusted with 
trade secrets. However, 15 percent of workers without a four-year college degree are subject to 
non-competes, and 14 percent of workers earning less than $40,000 have non-competes. This 
is true even though workers without four-year degrees are half as likely to possess trade secrets 
as those with four-year degrees, and workers earning less than $40,000 possess trade secrets at 
less than half of the rate of their higher-earning counterparts.”). 
 34.  Id. (twenty-nine percent of non-compete agreements occur in occupations where 
employees earn less than $40,000 per year plus occupations where employees did not earn a 
four-year degree). In Utah specifically, thirteen percent of food preparation employees are 
asked to sign non-compete agreements. CICERO, supra note 11, at 17. Additionally, fourteen 
percent of Utah employees with less than a high-school education sign non-compete 
agreements. Id. at 20.  
 35.  Some authors argue that protecting trade secrets is inappropriate no matter the 
situation. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of 
Justification, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 241, 245 (1998) (arguing that “[n]either the fact that a trade 
secret is information nor the fact that it is secret provides a convincing reason to impose 
liability for a nonconsensual taking”). 
 36.  See Radio One, Inc. v. Wooten, 452 F. Supp. 2d 754, 758 (E.D. Mich. 2006) 
(finding that the plaintiff had an “interest in protecting its business good will” through a non-
compete agreement). 
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the advantage . . . acquired by an establishment, beyond the mere 
value of the capital, stocks, funds or property employed therein, in 
consequence of the general patronage . . . it receives from . . . 
habitual customers on account of its location, or local position or 
reputation for quality, skill, integrity or punctuality.37  
A former employee could harm this goodwill by drawing away 
recurring customers from the former employer or by spreading 
negative information about the former employer to its current 
customers.38 A non-compete agreement limits this possibility by 
restricting the former employee to work in markets that are not 
simultaneously occupied by the former employer. 
c. Non-compete agreements protect an employer’s investment in 
employee training.39 Many employers invest significant resources into 
specialized employee training.40 Some argue that without non-
compete agreements, employers will lose the incentive “to invest 
time, money and training in their employees if they can simply leave 
with that skill and training and go to work for a direct competitor.”41 
Non-compete agreements protect an employer’s investment in 
employee training by providing the employee with a perceived 
constraint commitment42 to stay in the employee-employer 
relationship. In other words, non-compete agreements make it more 
difficult for the employee to leave the employer and, from the 
 
 37.  Peterson v. Jackson, 2011 UT App 113, ¶ 35, 253 P.3d 1096, 1106 (Utah Ct. 
App. 2011) (quoting Jackson v. Caldwell, 415 P.2d 667, 670 (Utah 1966)). 
 38.  See generally Allen v. Rose Park Pharmacy, 237 P.2d 823, 827–28 (Utah 1951) 
(“[A] covenant not to compete is necessary for the protection of the goodwill of the business 
when it is shown that although the employee learns no trade secrets, he may likely draw away 
customers from his former employer, if he were permitted to compete nearby.”). 
 39.  See generally Borg-Warner Protective Servs. Corp. v. Guardsmark, Inc., 946 F. 
Supp. 495 (E.D. Ky. 1996) (finding employee training as an interest which non-compete 
agreements may protect). 
 40.  William R. Knowlton, Implementing Noncompete Agreements in Utah: Protecting 
Business Trade Secrets, Goodwill, and Investment in Employees, UTAH Bus. J., May/June 2014, 
at 16, 17. 
 41.  Petersen & Stelter, supra note 15. 
 42.  In relationships, including employer-employee relationships, “constraint 
commitment reflects feelings of entrapment or barriers to exiting a relationship.” Michelle 
Givertz, Chris Segrin & Alesia Hanzal, The Association Between Satisfaction and Commitment 
Differs Across Marital Couple Types, 36 COMM. RES. 561, 564 (2009). 
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employer’s perspective, waste the time and resources it provided to 
the employee during training. 
d. Non-compete agreements foster company research and develop-
ment.43 Theoretically, by allowing non-compete agreements to 
protect trade secrets, employers are encouraged to “pursu[e] 
technological, medical, and other advances, inasmuch as society as a 
whole would continue to benefit from such advances.”44 According 
to employers, this pursuit of additional research and development 
should “support the growth of business.”45 However, some research 
indicates that non-compete agreements are associated with decreased 
spending on research and development,46 a lack of employee 
motivation,47 and a general dearth of startup companies.48 These 
indications largely refute the claim that non-compete agreements are 
good for business by fostering research and development.49 
2. Drawbacks to employees 
Even with the perceived benefits and interests to employers that 
non-compete agreements may protect, courts are still reluctant to 
enforce non-compete agreements, primarily because of the effects of 
 
 43.  Abigail Shechtman Nicandri, Comment, The Growing Disfavor of Non-Compete 
Agreements in the New Economy and Alternative Approaches for Protecting Employers’ 
Proprietary Information and Trade Secrets, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1003, 1013 (2011). 
 44.  Jessica Lee, The Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine: Safeguarding the Privacy of Trade 
Secrets, 33 COLO. LAW. 17, 17 (2004). 
 45.  Petersen & Stelter, supra note 15. 
 46.  Nicandri, supra note 43, at 1013 (“[E]nforcement of CNCs [non-compete 
agreements] actually tends to be accompanied by decreased spending on R&D [research 
and design].”). 
 47.  Id. at 1013–14 (stating that an employee’s motivation “to develop new ideas for an 
existing employer” may decrease “since the employee knows he [or she] will not be able to 
profit from the idea or start a new business using that concept”). 
 48.  Id. at 1014. 
 49.  Regardless, employers still use the research and development argument as support 
for non-compete agreements, and thus the argument is included here. See id. at 1013; WHITE 
HOUSE, supra note 24, at 2 (“The main rationale for these agreements is to 
encourage innovation . . . .”). 
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non-compete agreements on employees.50 Two main drawbacks are 
addressed below. 
a. Non-compete agreements promote an imbalance of bargaining 
power.51 Employees generally have less bargaining power than 
employers because their livelihood is tied to a good-paying job.52 
Therefore, employers can exploit this imbalance of power by 
imposing non-compete agreements on employees who otherwise 
would not accept them.53 The imbalance grows when an already-
hired employee enters into a non-compete agreement with a current 
employer because the “threat of discharge” exists.54 
b. Non-compete agreements hinder employee mobility and restrict 
employee choice.55 Society generally favors employee mobility because 
it ensures that employees will have the best chance of being 
productive members of society and achieving success.56 However, 
by  their nature, non-compete agreements restrict movement by 
preventing employees from working in certain geographical areas for 
some amount of time or from working for other employers for 
specified amounts of time. 
 
 50.  Rachel Arnow-Richman, Cubewrap Contracts and Worker Mobility: The Dilution of 
Employee Bargaining Power Via Standard Form Noncompetes, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 963, 
965 [hereinafter Arnow-Richman, Cubewrap Contracts]. 
 51.  See Viva R. Moffat, The Wrong Tool for the Job: The IP Problem with Noncompetition 
Agreements, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 873, 882 (2010) (discussing standard-form contracts, 
including non-compete agreements, as “the product of vastly unequal bargaining power”). 
 52.  Arnow-Richman, Cubewrap Contracts, supra note 50, at 963–64. 
 53.  Id. at 966–67. 
 54.  Michael J. Garrison & John T. Wendt, Employee Non-Competes and Consideration: 
A Proposed Good Faith Standard for the “Afterthought” Agreement, 64 U. KAN. L. REV. 409, 
412–13 (2015) (“An employee’s bargaining power is substantially diminished after 
employment has commenced, and the threat of discharge is a potent weapon that employers 
can use to secure an afterthought agreement (a non-compete agreement signed after 
employment commences).”). 
 55.  Lee, supra note 44, at 17. 
 56.  Norman D. Bishara & Michelle Westermann-Behaylo, The Law and Ethics of 
Restrictions on an Employee’s Post-Employment Mobility, 49 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 7–8 (2012). 
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B. States’ Regulation of Non-Compete Agreements57 
State laws regarding non-compete agreements are as varied as the 
reasons for having non-compete agreements. Commentators 
generally separate these laws into three different groups: (1) laws 
that allow non-compete agreements if the agreements meet a 
reasonableness standard, (2) laws that prohibit non-compete 
agreements with some exceptions, and (3) laws that ban employer-
employee non-compete agreements altogether.58 Utah’s Act creates a 
hybrid of these different approaches that presents some difficulties.59 
Many states follow some sort of common-law reasonableness 
approach based on the historical development of non-compete 
agreements “as restraints on trade.”60 Consequently, the 
reasonableness approach scrutinizes non-compete agreements more 
thoroughly than traditional contract law.61 Presumably, the 
reasonableness approach tries to balance non-compete agreements’ 
competing benefits to employers and detriments to employees by 
establishing an enforceability formulation: “[A] covenant in an 
agreement between an employer and a former employee restricting 
 
 57.  This section only attempts to categorize the many different state laws regarding 
non-compete agreements to provide context and background for the discussion in Part III of 
Utah’s Act. Each approach to non-compete agreements has its proponents and detractors, a 
discussion of which would be too expansive for the scope of this Comment. For a discussion of 
the benefits of a complete ban on non-compete agreements, see LOBEL, supra note 18; On 
Amir & Orly Lobel, Driving Performance: A Growth Theory of Noncompete Law, 16 STAN. 
TECH. L. REV. 833 (2013); Gilson, supra note 17. For scholars who question the reasoning 
and data in support of bans on non-compete agreements, see Norman D. Bishara & Evan 
Starr, The Incomplete Noncompete Picture, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 497 (2016); Jonathan 
M. Barnett & Ted Sichelman, Revisiting Labor Mobility in Innovation Markets (Univ. S. Cal. 
Ctr. for Law and Soc. Sci. Research Papers Series, Paper No. CLASS16-13, 2016), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2758854. 
 58.  Viva R. Moffat, Making Non-Competes Unenforceable, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 939, 
941 (2012). 
 59.  See discussion infra Part III.  
 60.  Moffat, supra note 58, at 945. Of these states, some “have non-compete statutes 
that essentially restate the common-law rule of reason.” Id. at 948. 
 61. See generally Daniel P. O’Gorman, Contract Theory and Some Realism About 
Employee Covenant Not to Compete Cases, 65 SMU L. REV. 145, 184 (2012) (“[B]ecause 
[non-compete] agreements were considered in restraint of trade and therefore had to be 
‘reasonable’ to be enforced, such agreements would never be welcomed fully into the realm of 
pure contract and its related idea of ‘freedom of contract.’”). 
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the former employee’s working activities is enforceable only if it is 
reasonably tailored in scope, geography, and time to further a 
protectable interest of the employer.”62 Virginia, New York, 
Texas,  and Delaware are some of the states that follow the 
reasonableness standard.63 
A minority of states, like Colorado,64 Louisiana,65 and Nevada,66 
generally prohibit non-compete agreements between employers and 
employees unless the agreements fall within specific exceptions. 
These states have a desire “to prevent an individual from 
contractually depriving himself [or herself] of the ability to support 
himself [or herself] and consequently becoming a public burden.”67 
However, they also recognize “limited instances in which a contract 
can restrict the exercise of a lawful profession,”68 such as promoting 
an employer’s goodwill. 
California leads the small number of states that have banned 
non-compete agreements entirely,69 joined only by Montana,70 North 
 
 62.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMP’T LAW § 8.06 (AM. LAW INST. 1999). Many states 
utilize some form of these factors. See, e.g., Senture, LLC v. Dietrich, 575 F. Supp. 2d 724, 
728 (E.D. Va. 2008) (discussing that Kentucky law takes into account geographic and time 
restrictions when determining reasonableness in non-compete agreements); Nat. Organics, 
Inc. v. Kirkendall, 860 N.Y.S.2d 142, 143 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) (“A non-compete agreement 
must also be reasonably limited temporally and geographically.”). 
 63.  For an extensive survey of all states and their non-compete laws, see Employee 
Noncompetes: A State by State Survey, BECK REED RIDDEN LLP, https://www.faircompetitionl 
aw.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Noncompetes-50-State-Survey-Chart-20170711.pdf 
(last updated July 11, 2017) (except for the states mentioned here, the accuracy of this survey 
has not been independently verified). 
 64.  COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-2-113 (West 2013). In Colorado, covenants not to 
compete are void unless contracted to protect trade secrets, among other exceptions. Id. 
 65.  LA. STAT. ANN. § 23:921(C) (2010 & Supp. 2017). In Louisiana, non-compete 
agreements are unenforceable unless agreed upon within a specific area and during a specific 
time frame not to exceed two years. Id. 
 66.  NEV. REV. STAT. § 613.200 (2015). In Nevada, any employer who willfully 
prevents any employee from gaining employment elsewhere “is guilty of a gross misdemeanor 
and shall be punished by a fine of not more than $5,000.” Id. Excepted from this restriction is 
an agreement that prevents the employee from directly competing with the former employer or 
disclosing to a future employer any trade secrets of the former employer. Id. 
 67.  USI Ins. Servs., LLC v. Tappel, 09-149, p. 7 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/10/09); 28 So. 
3d 419,  423 (La. Ct. App. 2009). 
 68.  Id., 28 So. 3d at 424. 
 69.  See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 2017) (“Except as provided in this 
chapter, every contract by which anyone is restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, 
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Dakota,71 and Oklahoma.72 By banning the agreements, these states 
demonstrate that, for their state policies, “open competition and 
employee mobility” and protecting “the important legal right of 
persons to engage in businesses and occupations of their choosing”73 
outweigh the benefits that non-compete agreements give 
to employers. 
III. THE CURRENT STATE OF  
NON-COMPETE AGREEMENTS IN UTAH 
Utah, however, does not fit comfortably in any of the above 
categories. Unlike states that have generally prohibited or entirely 
banned non-compete agreements, Utah law allows for non-compete 
agreements,74 which situates Utah closer to states that follow the 
common-law reasonableness approach. However, Utah non-compete 
agreements are not entirely governed by the reasonableness standard 
because although time restrictions greater than one year may be 
 
trade, or business of any kind is to that extend void.”). Exceptions do not involve employee-
employer non-compete agreements but instead involve non-competes in relation to the sale of 
a business, § 16601, the dissolution of a partnership, § 16602, or the sale of a limited liability 
company, § 16602.5. California clearly has had success while employing this model, but the 
other states following the model have not had the same success. Thus, other factors must be 
contributing to California’s growth that minimize the effect that California’s ban on non-
compete agreements is having on businesses in the state. See, e.g., Brad Templeton, The Real 
Secret Behind Silicon Valley’s Success, FORBES (July 11, 2012, 5:00 PM), https://www. 
forbes.com/sites/singularity/2012/07/11/the-real-secret-behind-silicon-valleys-success/#40 
8a39b775e1 (summarizing several factors contributing to Silicon Valley growth in California 
and hypothesizing that a strong sense of the American dream in immigrant business founders is 
a leading factor); Neil Koenig, Next Silicon Valleys: How Did California Get It So Right?, BBC 
(Feb. 9, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-26041341 (interviewing several 
Silicon Valley experts “why they thought the area had been so successful”).  
 70.  MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-703 (West 2009) (“Any contract by which anyone is 
restrained from exercising a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind . . . is to that 
extent void.”).  
 71.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-08-06 (2006) (“Every contract by which anyone is 
restrained from exercising a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind is to that extent 
void . . . .”). North Dakota has the same exceptions as California with regards to selling a 
business or partnership. Id. 
 72.  OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 219A (West 2013). 
 73.  Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 189 P.3d 285, 291 (Cal. 2008). 
 74.  See UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-51-201 (West Supp. 2017). 
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reasonable in some circumstances under the common law,75 the Act 
summarily rejects those restrictions.76 Thus, Utah law is not entirely 
comparable to the common-law reasonableness states. The outright 
rejection of all non-compete agreements greater than one year is 
more like the policy of states that ban non-compete agreements 
altogether. Therefore, because Utah utilizes both statutory 
requirements and common-law reasonableness, and bans some non-
compete agreements all together, Utah is a hybrid of the different 
approaches to non-compete agreements. 
Like states that either ban non-compete agreements entirely or 
severely restrict their use, Utah, through the Act, seems to prioritize 
employee mobility and employee right to choose their employers and 
occupations. Representative Mike Schultz, one of the Act’s sponsors 
in the House of Representatives, stated that the Act will “mak[e] it 
so that the employees of our state have the opportunity to go out 
and start their own businesses if they would like” and can “move to 
another job to . . . be able to provide for their families.”77 However, 
Representative Schultz also stated that, regarding the attorney’s fees 
mandate of the Act, “those who have legitimate reasons for their 
non-compete agreements will be just fine.”78 Unfortunately, 
Representative Schultz’s statement ignored the intricacies of Utah’s 
statutory-and-common-law world for non-compete agreements. The 
following discussion will show that, although the Act was enacted 
based on compelling policy reasons, the confusing state of the 
common law—which was in large part unremedied by the Act—
leaves a difficult task for employers when determining how to craft 
enforceable non-compete agreements that will avoid automatic 
attorney’s fees and costs. 
 
 75.  See, e.g., Sys. Concepts, Inc. v. Dixon, 669 P.2d 421, 426 (Utah 1983) (“The 
subject [anticompetition] covenant contains a two-year time restriction, which is clearly, or at 
least ‘probably’ reasonable . . . .”). 
 76.  See § 34-51-201. 
 77.  Utah 2016 General Legislative Session, House - Day 44 2016 Part 3, at 2:20:08, 
UTAH STATE LEGISLATURE, http://utahlegislature.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?clip_id=
20219&meta_id=629364 (last visited Dec. 2, 2017) (House Floor Debate on 10 H.B. 251, 
Post-Employment Restrictions Amendments, held Mar. 9, 2016) (statement of Rep. Schultz). 
 78. Id. at 2:21:40. 
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A. The Common-Law Requirement(s) of  
Enforceable Non-Compete Agreements 
Currently, Utah’s common law governing non-compete 
agreements seems to follow two competing tests, each stemming 
from a Utah Supreme Court case decided in 1951, Allen v. Rose Park 
Pharmacy.79 These competing standards will be discussed in turn, 
followed by an analysis of the most difficult factors in each test 
that  an employer must meet to draft an enforceable non-
compete agreement. 
1. The Rose Park standard 
In Rose Park, an employee signed a non-compete agreement 
upon beginning employment as a manager for a pharmacy.80 The 
non-compete agreement stated that for a period of five years after 
termination, the employee would not work for a pharmacy or drug 
store within a two-mile radius of the pharmacy.81 After only one year 
of employment, the pharmacy terminated the employee.82 The 
employee sued to determine if the non-compete agreement was 
enforceable, presumably because the employee wished to operate a 
competing business within the two-mile radius.83 The court held that 
the non-compete agreement was valid because the agreement (1) 
was supported by adequate consideration, (2) was not negotiated in 
bad faith, (3) was “necessary to protect the good will of the 
 
 79. See Allen v. Rose Park Pharmacy, 237 P.2d 823 (Utah 1951). This case, and the two 
competing standards that come from it, seems to illustrate the belief that “the ambiguity 
surrounding the enforceability of [non-competes] has resulted in vast amounts of litigation and 
reported appellate decisions. Despite this abundance of legal precedent, it still is difficult for 
lawyers to predict confidently how a court will react to any given noncompetition clause.” 
Peter J. Whitmore, A Statistical Analysis of Noncompetition Clauses in Employment Contracts, 
15 J. CORP. L. 483, 485 (1990) (citations omitted). 
 80.  Rose Park, 237 P.2d at 824. 
 81.  Id. 
 82.  Id. at 824–25. 
 83.  Id. The employee sued “for a declaratory judgment to determine the validity of [a 
non-compete agreement] in the contract of employment.” Id. The employer had not yet tried 
to enforce the non-compete agreement, so the employee was not challenging the enforceability 
of the non-compete agreement. Instead, the employee likely wanted to preemptively make sure 
the agreement would not be enforceable before operating the competing business. 
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business,” and (4) was “reasonable in its restrictions as to time 
and area.”84 
2. The Robbins standard and subsequent cases 
Even though the Rose Park opinion succinctly stated the factors 
that the court examined while determining enforceability, a later 
opinion muddied the waters. In Robbins v. Finlay, a hearing aid 
salesman quit his job and immediately started a rival business selling 
hearing aids.85 This action directly violated his non-compete 
agreement, which stated that the salesman would not compete with 
the employer in Utah for one year after terminating employment.86 
The employer sued to enforce the agreement, but the court held that 
the agreement was unenforceable because the salesman did not 
possess trade secrets that were afforded protection.87 In so holding, 
the court seemed to add additional requirements to the Rose 
Park factors: 
 Covenants not to compete are enforceable if carefully drawn to 
protect only the legitimate interests of the employer. The 
reasonableness of a covenant depends upon several factors, 
including its geographical extent; the duration of the limitation; the 
nature of the employee’s duties; and the nature of the interest 
which the employer seeks to protect such as trade secrets, the 
goodwill of his business, or an extraordinary investment in the 
training or education of the employee.88 
In Robbins—contrary to Rose Park—the Court neglected 
consideration and bad faith as factors to consider but introduced 
employee duties, employer trade secrets, and employee training.89 
 
 84.  Id. at 828. 
 85.  Robbins v. Finlay, 645 P.2d 623, 624 (Utah 1982). 
 86.  Id. at 624 n.2. 
 87.  Id. at 628. 
 88.  Id. at 627. The court cited as the first authority for this position a case from 
Pennsylvania. Id. The court only cited Rose Park as additional support for its position, along 
with cases from Nebraska, and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. Id. By not citing Rose 
Park as the first authority and limiting its statement to the requirements therein, the court 
seemed to expand upon the holding in Rose Park. 
 89.  See id. But see Rose Park, 237 P.2d at 828. 
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Soon after Robbins was decided, the Utah Supreme Court 
appeared to remedy the Robbins decision in System Concepts, Inc. v. 
Dixon by requiring non-compete agreements to satisfy the specific 
standards set forth in Rose Park,90 not Robbins. Dixon seemed to 
implicitly return the standard to Rose Park by adding consideration 
and bad faith to the equation and removing employee duties, trade 
secrets, and employee training.91 But Dixon did not specifically 
overturn the additional factors in Robbins. 
Therefore, while courts in a majority of cases have applied the 
Rose Park standard,92 some courts still follow the Robbins factors. For 
example, in Systems West Performance, LLC v. Farland, a Utah federal 
district court held that a non-compete agreement was reasonable, 
and therefore enforceable, because the agreement satisfied all the 
Robbins factors.93 Additionally, in Scenic Aviation, Inc. v. Blick, the 
same court found a restrictive covenant unenforceable because the 
covenant was not “carefully drawn to protect only the legitimate 
interests of the employer,” specifically the employer’s trade secrets 
and goodwill as required in Robbins.94 Other cases follow these 
examples.95 Thus, because of the competing Rose Park and Robbins 
standards, Utah employers may be unsure of which standard their 
non-compete agreements should be structured to meet. 
 
 90.  Sys. Concepts, Inc. v. Dixon, 669 P.2d 421 (Utah 1983). For a non-compete 
agreement to be enforceable, the “requirements are that: (1) the covenant be supported by 
consideration; (2) no bad faith be shown in the negotiation of the contract; (3) the covenant 
be necessary to protect the goodwill of the business; and (4) it be reasonable in its restrictions 
as to time and area.” Id. at 425–26. 
 91.  See id. 
 92.  See, e.g., Elec. Distribs., Inc. v. SFR, Inc., 166 F.3d 1074 (10th Cir. 1999) 
(applying Utah law); Bad Ass Coffee Co. of Haw., Inc. v. JH Nterprises, L.L.C., 636 F. Supp. 
2d 1237, 1245–46 (D. Utah 2009); TruGreen Cos. v. Mower Bros., 2008 UT 81, 199 
P.3d 929. 
 93.  Sys. W. Performance, LLC v. Farland, No. 2:14-cv-00276-DN-BCW, 2015 WL 
4920962, at *3–5 (D. Utah Aug. 18, 2015). 
 94.  Scenic Aviation, Inc. v. Blick, No. 2:02-CV-01201 PGC, 2003 WL 26060445, at 
*5 (D. Utah Aug. 4, 2003). 
 95.  See, e.g., First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. Nw. Title Ins. Agency, LLC, No. 2:15-cv-
00229-DN, 2016 WL 6902473 (D. Utah Nov. 23, 2016); Hunt v. Key, No. 2:13CV83, 2014 
WL 722487 (D. Utah Feb. 24, 2014); Kasco Servs. Corp. v. Benson, 831 P.2d 86 (Utah 
1992) (discussing both the Robbins and Rose Park standards). 
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3. Inconsistency within the factors 
Even if a court applies the standard that an employer anticipates, 
some factors within the standards are often applied inconsistently.96 
Each such factor is examined below.97 
a. Goodwill. Courts have a difficult time determining whether a 
non-compete agreement is necessary to protect a company’s 
goodwill in large part because of “a strong connection between [an 
employer’s] ability to stop a former [employee] from competing and 
[the employer’s] goodwill.”98 In Bad Ass Coffee Co. of Hawaii v. JH 
Nterprises, L.L.C., the court found that a non-compete agreement 
was enforceable because the agreement protected a coffee shop’s 
goodwill.99 The court reasoned that two factors contributed to the 
necessity of the non-compete agreement in protecting the coffee 
shop’s goodwill: (1) the employee opening a competing coffee shop 
could be seen as a negative message about the coffee shop to the 
market, and (2) allowing the employee to open a competing shop 
could send a message to other employees that the behavior 
was acceptable.100 
 
 96.  The other factors left undiscussed are applied relatively consistently in Utah. 
 97.  Some have written that consideration may also be applied inconsistently in the 
future. See Darren Nadel & Stephen E. Baumann, II, Utah Enacts Post-Employment Restrictions 
Act, LITTLER (March 31, 2016), https://www.littler.com/publication-press/publication/ 
utah-enacts-post-employment-restrictions-act (“Adequate consideration will be a fluid concept. 
In fact, the final version of the Act excluded a proposed definition of ‘[a]dequate 
consideration’ that was limited to ‘compensation, stocks, or anything of economic value that is 
paid, granted, given, donated, or transferred to an employee in a single transaction and that 
equals or exceeds 5% of the annual salary of the employee determined as of the day on which a 
post-employment restrictive covenant is signed.’”). Current case law indicates that 
consideration has been applied consistently so far. This makes some intuitive sense because 
non-compete agreements are often part of employment contracts. Employment contracts are 
rarely unsupported by consideration because “an employer’s promise of employment under 
certain terms and for an indefinite period constitutes . . . the employer’s consideration for the 
employment contract. The employee’s performance of service pursuant to the employer’s offer 
constitutes . . . the employee’s consideration for the contract.” Johnson v. Morton Thiokol, 
Inc., 818 P.2d 997, 1002 (Utah 1991). Therefore, this factor was not discussed in detail in 
this Comment. 
 98. Bad Ass Coffee Co. of Haw., Inc. v. JH Nterprises, L.L.C., 636 F. Supp. 2d 1237, 
1245–46 (D. Utah 2009). 
 99.  Id. at 1246. 
 100.  Id. 
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The employee, in defense of his position that the non-compete 
agreement failed to reasonably protect the coffee shop’s goodwill, 
argued that the plain language of the agreement meant that the 
employee could not open any store, shop, restaurant, or other 
establishment that happened to sell coffee and thus compete with 
the coffee shop.101 The employee believed that this plain language 
pointed to the non-compete agreement restricting activities that 
were unrelated to the coffee shop’s goodwill.102 The court disagreed, 
reasoning that, in Utah, “courts avoid reading covenants not to 
compete in a manner that would render them unreasonable,”103 
and  the employee’s proposed reading would render the 
agreement unreasonable.104 
However, the court failed to consider a key principle underlying 
the Robbins factors when deciding that Utah courts do not read non-
compete agreements in a way that would create unreasonable 
agreements: “Covenants not to compete are enforceable if carefully 
drawn to protect only the legitimate interests of the employer.”105 
The Robbins court indicated that the plain language of the non-
compete agreement should be carefully drawn to avoid limiting 
competition.106 Therefore, if a non-compete agreement is designed 
primarily to limit employer competition or restrain choice, the non-
compete agreement is unenforceable because limiting competition 
and restraining choice likely are not legitimate interests.107 These 
statements seem to contradict the Bad Ass Coffee court’s decision to 
avoid reading the covenant in an unreasonable way. Of course, the 
Bad Ass Coffee court was applying the Rose Park standard,108 so 
perhaps the Robbins standard requires carefully-drawn agreements 
 
 101.  Id. 
 102.  Id. 
 103.  Id.  
 104. See id. at 1246–47 (declaring, after discussing the employee’s proposed reading, that 
employees “are unlikely to convince a court (or arbitrator) that the non-compete clauses at 
issue here are unenforceable”). 
 105.  Robbins v. Finlay, 645 P.2d 623, 627 (Utah 1982) (emphasis added). 
 106.  See id. (“In this case, the covenant [not to compete] served no purpose other than 
restricting an employee from competing with a former employer.”). 
 107.  See id. 
 108.  See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
5.ROBBINS_FIN.NO HEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/12/2018  10:50 AM 
1227 A Solution to Utah’s Non-Compete Dilemma 
 1247 
when examining its goodwill factor, while the Rose Park standard 
allows courts to avoid unreasonable renditions of non-compete 
agreements while analyzing its own goodwill factor. But this 
distinction is not clear from the Bad Ass Coffee court’s analysis.109 
b. Limitations on scope. Both the Robbins and Rose Park standards 
require reasonable limitations on time and area restrictions.110 The 
reasonableness of these restraints is “determined on a case-by-case 
basis, taking into account the particular facts and circumstances 
surrounding the case” and the non-compete agreement.111 When 
circumstances are taken into account on a case-by-case basis, 
uncertainty about the legality of non-compete agreements 
increases.112 This uncertainty, in turn, leads courts to apply 
inconsistent limitations on the scope of non-compete agreements. 
Uncertainty in both time and geographic limitations are 
examined below.  
(1) Uncertainty about how courts evaluate limitations on time 
has produced widely varied results. Courts generally uphold a time 
limitation if it is “necessary in its full extent for the protection of 
some legitimate interest of the promisee, and it must not be unduly 
harsh and oppressive to the covenantor.”113 However, courts have 
been inconsistent in their application of this rule. For example, Utah 
courts have declared non-compete agreements valid with one-year to 
twenty-five-year time restrictions.114 The facts of these cases range 
from a one-year provision for title company office managers115 to a 
 
 109.  See generally Bad Ass Coffee Co., 636 F. Supp. 2d 1237. 
 110.  Robbins, 645 P.2d at 627; Allen v. Rose Park Pharmacy, 237 P.2d 823, 828 
(Utah 1951). 
 111.  Elec. Distribs., Inc. v. SFR, Inc., 166 F.3d 1074, 1085 (10th Cir. 1999) (quoting 
Sys. Concepts, Inc. v. Dixon, 669 P.2d 421, 427 (Utah 1983)) (applying Utah law). One 
important consideration in this determination is “the location and nature of the employer’s 
clientele.” Id. (quoting Sys. Concepts, 669 P.2d at 427). 
 112.  See Alan A. Fisher & Robert H. Lande, Efficiency Considerations in Merger 
Enforcement, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1580, 1655 (1983) (“Any type of a case-by-case approach 
would greatly increase business uncertainty.”). 
 113.  Elec. Distribs., 166 F.3d at 1085. 
 114.  Christopher Mack, Note, Postemployment Noncompete Agreements: Why Utah Should 
Depart from the Majority, 2015 UTAH L. REV. 1201, 1204. 
 115.  See First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. Nw. Title Ins. Agency, LLC, No. 2:15-cv-00229-DN, 
2016 WL 6902473, at *17 (D. Utah Nov. 23, 2016). 
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twenty-five-year agreement relating to the sale of a mortuary.116 
These mixed results provide little guidance to employers trying to 
draft enforceable non-compete agreements. 
(2) Uncertainty about how courts determine the reasonableness 
of geographic limitations makes it difficult for employers to structure 
the limitation. “Ordinarily, a covenant is enforceable if it specifies an 
area no greater than that to which the business extends, and it is 
unenforceable if it specifies a territory broader than encompassed by 
the . . . business.”117 But determining the area in which a business 
extends is a difficult task.118 For example, in Electrical Distributors, 
Inc. v. SFR, Inc., the court held that a restriction not to compete in 
the entire state of Utah for seven years was reasonable because the 
company enforcing the non-compete agreement had customers in 
several different cities throughout the state.119 However, the court 
admitted that the question of “where the bulk of the customers were 
located” was left unanswered.120 In that case, the question was not 
enough to call into doubt the reasonableness of the restriction,121 but 
under a different set of circumstances, it may be enough to tip the 
scale toward unreasonableness.122 
However, the customers’ location may not be as important as the 
employee’s operating region within the company’s geographical area. 
For example, in Vivint, Inc. v. Dahl, a Utah state district court case, 
 
 116.  See Valley Mortuary v. Fairbanks, 225 P.2d 739, 741–42 (Utah 1950). 
 117.  Elec. Distribs., 166 F.3d at 1085. 
 118.  Kyle B. Sill, Drafting Effective Noncompete Clauses and Other Restrictive Covenants: 
Considerations Across the United States, 14 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 365, 380 (2013) (“Courts 
have upheld—and conversely rejected—distances from a few miles, to cities, entire states, 
countries, and the world.”). 
 119.  Elec. Distribs., 166 F.3d at 1085. 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  See id. 
 122.  For example, imagine a company that has thousands of clients in Nevada, Utah, and 
Idaho. That same company has only a few hundred clients in California, but these clients are 
spread out from San Francisco southward to San Diego. The company requires its employees 
to sign a non-compete agreement as a condition to employment. The agreement states that the 
employee, for a certain number of years, will not perform work in the company’s industry in 
the states of Nevada, Utah, Idaho, and California. Even though the company has clients in 
California, the minimal number of clients compared with the loss of employee mobility (not 
being able to work in California, with its millions of residents) may persuade a court to reason 
differently than the court in Electrical Distributors. 
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the court granted a former employee’s Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment on the issue of whether a restrictive covenant was 
unenforceable.123 The restrictive covenant provided that the 
employee would not compete against Vivint by convincing any 
customer to cease dealing with the company.124 In granting the 
motion, the court reasoned that the employee, who sold alarm 
systems to customers in only two states, could not be restricted from 
competing against his former employer by coming into contact with 
any customer in essentially any area of the United States.125 This 
restriction, even though limited to only Vivint customers, was not 
“reasonably tailored to protect the interests of Vivint.”126  
While the agreement in question did not specify a geographic 
area, the court imputed one to the agreement by inferring from the 
circumstances that Vivint intended to restrict the employee to non-
competition in any area where the company also operated.127 Thus, 
in contrast with Electrical Distributors, in which the court analyzed 
the reasonableness of a geographic limitation by examining the 
number of customers in a particular area, the Vivint court analyzed 
the reasonableness of a geographic limitation by the actual contact 
that an employee had with the company in a geographic area. 
But, in Systems West Performance, a Utah federal district court 
found that a non-compete provision devoid of any geographic 
restrictions was still “reasonably limited by certain activity 
restrictions.”128 Specifically, the activity restrictions forbade the 
employee “from working for any client or prospective client of [the 
employer].”129 This limitation was even broader than the 
unreasonable restriction in Vivint not to contact its customers, 
 
 123.  In this case, the covenant seems to combine non-solicitation and non-compete 
agreements together. The court analyzed both under the Rose Park standard. See Order 
Granting Defendant’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 2–5, Vivint, Inc. v. Dahl, No. 
130401309 (4th Dist. Ct. Utah Mar. 21, 2016). 
 124.  Id. at 2. 
 125.  Id. at 5. 
 126.  Id. 
 127.  Id. 
 128.  Sys. W. Performance, LLC v. Farland, No. 2:14-cv-00276-DN-BCW, 2015 WL 
4920962, at *4 (D. Utah Aug. 18, 2015). 
 129.  Id. 
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because this limitation also included prospective customers. Yet, the 
court here found that the restriction was reasonable.130 
These three cases highlight some of the difficult uncertainties 
that employers face when drafting enforceable, reasonable 
geographic restrictions: uncertainty as to (1) the area in which a 
business operates, (2) the importance of the employee’s involvement 
in that area, and (3) the interpretation of provisions that limit non-
compete agreements in ways other than geographical restrictions. 
B. The Act and its Possible Effects 
1. A review of the Act as currently enacted 
The Post-Employment Restrictions Act became effective on May 
10, 2016.131 The Act applies to only one subset of post-employment 
restrictions—non-compete agreements—and does not apply to non-
solicitation agreements, non-disclosure agreements, or con-
fidentiality agreements.132 Additionally, the legislature specifically 
exempted severance agreements and non-compete agreements 
related to selling a business from the Act.133 
The Act generally leaves the common law as is,134 with one major 
exception: “[A]n employer and an employee may not enter into a 
[non-compete agreement] for a period of more than one year from 
the day on which the employee is no longer employed by the 
employer.”135 Thus, the Act added certainty to the common law in 
this area.136 Any agreements entered into after the effective date that 
 
 130.  See id. at *5 (“Because each of the six factors Utah courts use to determine the 
reasonableness of non-compete clauses weigh[s] in favor of enforceability, the non-compete 
clause is reasonable and therefore enforceable, based on the pleadings.”). 
 131.  UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 34-51-101 to -301 (West Supp. 2017). 
 132.  Id. § 34-51-102(1)(b). 
 133.  Id. § 34-51-202(2). 
 134.  See id. § 34-51-201 (“In addition to any requirements imposed under common 
law . . . .”). 
 135.  Id. 
 136.  Theoretically, a court could still decide that a non-compete agreement with less 
than a one-year time restriction is unreasonable according to the particular facts and 
circumstances of a case. See generally Sys. Concepts, Inc. v. Dixon, 669 P.2d 421, 427 
(Utah 1983). 
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violate the one-year provision are void.137 Additionally, and most 
importantly for purposes of this Comment, if a non-compete 
agreement is deemed unenforceable by a court or arbitrator, “the 
employer is liable for the employee’s: (1) costs associated with 
arbitration; (2) attorney fees and court costs; and (3) 
actual damages.”138 
2. The effects of the Act’s attorney’s fees provision 
While the Act is laudable for the compromises represented in its 
passing,139 it leaves at least three significant questions about its effects 
on Utah employers. First, the Act clearly states that courts must not 
apply the one-year provision retroactively,140 but the Act does not 
state whether courts should apply the attorney’s fees provision 
retroactively to non-compete agreements entered into before May 
10, 2016. Therefore, agreements entered into before the Act was 
even introduced to the legislature may still be subject to the Act’s 
attorney’s fees provision. This concerning possibility is compounded 
by the fact that courts may see the legislature’s decision to limit non-
competes to one year as persuasive evidence that any non-competes 
with longer restrictions are unreasonable. Thus, despite the language 
of the Act, its provisions may retroactively punish all non-compete 
agreements exceeding one year. 
Second, the Act fails to address court remedies, such as 
bluelining141 and redlining,142 that reform unenforceable non-
 
 137.  UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-51-201. 
 138.  Id. § 34-51-301. 
 139.  Utah 2016 General Legislative Session, House – Day 44 2016 Part 3, at 2:19:52, 
UTAH STATE LEGISLATURE, http://utahlegislature.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?clip_id= 
20219&meta_id=629364 (last visited Dec. 2, 2017) (House Floor Debate on 10 H.B. 251, 
Post-employment Restrictions Amendments, held Mar. 9, 2016) (statement of Rep. Schultz) 
(discussing finding “a solution that is compatible to most people”). 
 140.  See UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-51-201. 
 141.  Raimonde v. Van Vlerah, 325 N.E.2d 544, 546 (Ohio 1975) (explaining that 
bluelining, or the blue-pencil doctrine, “provides that if unreasonable provisions exist in [a 
non-compete agreement], they may be stricken, if devisible, [sic] but not amended 
or modified”). 
 142. John S. Beckmann, Business Torts and Non-Compete Agreements, in 5A MINNESOTA 
PRACTICE SERIES, METHODS OF PRACTICE § 2, § 2.36 (Roger S. Haydock & Peter B. Knapp 
eds., 4th ed. Supp. 2017) (explaining that redlining is the process of taking an overly broad 
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compete agreements into enforceable ones. A court can apply both 
remedies on its own or through a separate contractual provision 
requiring reformation of the non-compete agreement.143 No Utah 
case has applied these doctrines to non-compete agreements, but 
courts are not yet required to disregard the doctrines either. Thus, a 
court could decide in the future to redline or blueline a non-
compete agreement in an effort to create an enforceable agreement. 
In such a situation, though the court would necessarily declare the 
original agreement unenforceable to reform the agreement, the end 
result of the case would be an enforceable agreement.144 Whether the 
attorney’s fees provision of the Act would apply in that case 
is unclear.  
Finally, the Act risks imposing attorney’s fees on employers who 
make good-faith efforts to comply with the common-law 
requirements, because attorney’s fees are imposed where “the post-
employment restrictive covenant is unenforceable”—for any 
reason.145 The Act compounds this result by regulating only one 
factor of the common law regarding non-compete agreements and 
leaving the other factors open to continued court interpretation. 
Attorney’s fees are generally “recoverable only if authorized by 
contract or statute.”146 Before the Act, the parties to a contract could 
freely negotiate for an attorney’s fees provision in non-compete 
agreements. Now, however, the Act unilaterally imposes attorney’s 
fees in an area where fees were previously at the discretion of 
the parties.  
 
geographic or temporal scope and “slashing their tenure [or] more tightly circumscribing their 
territorial limitations” to create a reasonable scope). 
 143.  See id.; Alina Klimkina, Note, Are Noncompete Contracts Between Physicians Bad 
Medicine? Advocating in the Affirmative by Drawing a Public Policy Parallel to the Legal 
Profession, 98 KY. L.J. 131, 134 (2009). 
 144.  See generally UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-51-301 (West Supp. 2017) (requiring an 
award of attorney’s fees if “the post-employment restrictive covenant is unenforceable,” but 
not discussing whether remedial tactics will delay this award). 
 145.  Id. 
 146.  Giles v. Mineral Res. Int’l, Inc., 2014 UT App 259, ¶ 17, 338 P.3d 825, 829–30. 
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IV. A SOLUTION TO THE AUTOMATIC ATTORNEY’S FEES 
PROVISION: LEAN ON NON-SOLICITATION AGREEMENTS 
Because of the many risks associated with using non-compete 
agreements in light of the automatic attorney’s fees provision and 
the already confusing common law, some employers may be leery 
about using non-compete agreements to protect their interests. 
However, employers can protect many of these interests by another 
common restrictive covenant—non-solicitation agreements.147 Non-
solicitation agreements primarily prohibit a former employee from 
soliciting a business’s customers or current employees to leave the 
business.148 Non-compete agreements and non-solicitation 
agreements are both considered restrictive covenants149 and are both 
analyzed under the same common-law standards of Rose Park or 
Robbins.150 Thus, both are still subject to the same dizzying effects of 
the common law as discussed in Part III, though non-solicitation 
agreements receive greater deference because they are more specific 
than non-compete agreements.151 But unlike non-compete 
 
 147.  Other methods also exist that may adequately substitute for non-competition 
agreements. See Nicandri, supra note 43 (discussing the inevitable disclosure doctrine, the 
Uniform Trade Secrets Act, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, garden leave clauses, 
forfeiture-for-competition clauses, and no-poach agreements). However, some of these 
methods often contain more searching standards of review than a relatively orthodox contract 
provision such as a non-solicitation agreement. See id. at 1019 (“Employers often enter into a 
[non-compete agreement] in order to avoid having to prove the elements of trade secret 
misappropriation [under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act] . . . .”). Other methods are far more 
difficult to implement. See generally id. at 1025–32. This Comment focuses on non-solicitation 
agreements due to these perceived deficiencies. 
 148.  Nonsolicitation Agreement, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 149.  See Brinton M. Wilkins, Enforcing Reasonable Restrictive Covenants Against Former 
Employees, UTAH EMP. L. LETTER, Nov. 2015, at 4. 
 150.  See Scenic Aviation, Inc. v. Blick, No. 2:02-CV-01201 PGC, 2003 WL 26060445, 
at *5 (D. Utah Aug. 4, 2003) (analyzing a non-solicitation agreement under the Robbins 
standard). But see Sys. W. Performance, LLC v. Farland, No. 2:14-cv-00276-DN-BCW, 2015 
WL 4920962, at *3–5 (D. Utah Aug. 18, 2015) (analyzing a non-solicitation agreement 
under the Rose Park standard). 
 151.  Elizabeth E. Nicholas, Note, Drafting Enforceable Non-Solicitation Agreements in 
Kentucky, 95 KY. L.J. 505, 508 (2006) (discussing non-solicitation agreements generally); see 
also M. SCOTT MCDONALD & JACQUELINE C. JOHNSON, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION IN EMPLOYMENT LAW: CONTRACT SOLUTIONS AND 
LITIGATION GUIDE 626 (2014) (“[N]onsolicitation clauses are more commonly viewed as 
something different and more readily enforced [than non-compete clauses].”). 
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agreements, non-solicitation agreements are excepted from the 
automatic attorney’s fees provision of the Act.152 Therefore, an 
employer will not be automatically penalized if an employer fails to 
navigate the common-law landscape to draft an enforceable non-
solicitation agreement. This Part will discuss the benefits and 
drawbacks of relying on non-solicitation agreements to protect 
employer interests and examine some practical ways to balance non-
solicitation and non-compete agreements to effectuate this goal. 
A. Non-Compete Agreements and  
Non-Solicitation Agreements: A Comparison 
Non-compete and non-solicitation agreements are “similar 
instruments”153 because non-solicitation agreements also protect 
most of the employer’s four interests protected by non-compete 
agreements.154 First, non-solicitation agreements also promote an 
employer’s goodwill by preventing an employee from drawing away 
the customers and other employees that partially define this 
goodwill.155 In fact, one court, commenting on the nuances of 
company goodwill, said, “[Goodwill] is the probability that old 
customers will resort to the old place or seek old friends . . . .”156 If 
an employee were to leave and pull away customers and “friends,” or 
other employees, company goodwill would thus be damaged. Non-
solicitation agreements prevent this from happening. 
Second, non-solicitation agreements also protect an employer’s 
investment in employee training by persuasively constraining 
employees from leaving the employer for greener pastures after the 
 
 152.  See supra note 131 and accompanying text. 
 153.  Erin E. Gould, Comment, Read the Fine Print: A Critical Look at Oregon’s 
Noncompete and Nonsolicitation Agreement Laws, 88 OR. L. REV. 515, 518 (2009). 
 154.  See discussion supra Part II. Non-compete agreements protect an employer’s trade 
secrets, promote an employer’s goodwill, protect an employer’s investment in employee 
training, and foster company research and development. 
 155.  See generally Allen v. Rose Park Pharmacy, 237 P.2d 823, 827–28 (Utah 1951) 
(“[A] covenant not to compete is necessary for the protection of the goodwill of the business 
when it is shown that although the employee learns no trade secrets, he may likely draw away 
customers from his former employer, if he were permitted to compete nearby.”). 
 156.  Peterson v. Jackson, 2011 UT App 113, ¶ 35, 253 P.3d 1096, 1106 (quoting 
Jackson v. Caldwell, 415 P.2d 667, 670 (Utah 1966)). 
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employee completes the training.157 On its face, the agreement does 
not restrict an employee from working in a particular area or for a 
particular company like a non-compete agreement. But non-
solicitation agreements may increase relocation costs enough to 
disincentivize the employee from leaving because non-solicitation 
agreements prevent employees from taking an established client base 
to another company—often a base with which the employee has 
spent time developing relationships.158 Additionally, discovering that 
another employer’s employee is under a non-solicitation agreement 
may discourage a possible employer from hiring that employee.159 
In addition to protecting an employer’s investment in a specific 
employee’s training, non-solicitation agreements may also protect an 
employer’s investment in the training of all employees. Many non-
solicitation agreements contain two parts: “agreements not to solicit 
employees, and agreements not to solicit clients.”160 Thus, even if an 
employee decides that the benefits of moving to another company 
outweigh the difficulty of developing a new client base, the non-
solicitation agreement will prohibit the employee from pulling away 
other employees to work with him or her at the new company, 
thereby protecting an employer’s investment in those other 
employees’ training. 
However, except for the employer’s customer lists that are 
impliedly protected under the agreement, non-solicitation 
agreements do not provide strong protection against an employee 
 
 157.  See MCDONALD & JOHNSON, supra note 151, at 674 (justifying non-solicitation 
clauses because they protect against “conversion of . . . specialized training”). 
 158.  As an example, imagine a salesperson who signs a non-solicitation agreement before 
beginning employment with a medical device company. The salesperson then expends a 
significant amount of time finding clients and developing professional relationships with these 
clients, most of whom are doctors. The clients are pleased with the salesperson and the 
products being sold, so the clients refer the salesperson to others. If this salesperson were to 
leave the medical device company and work for a competitor, the salesperson would be 
prohibited from selling to any former clients, and thus, again, the salesperson would have to 
spend time finding clients and building professional relationships. 
 159.  See Mary L. Mikva, Drafting Confidentiality, Non-Compete, and Non-Solicitation 
Agreements: The Employee’s Wish List, PRAC. LAW., June 2004, at 11, 14 (A non-solicitation 
agreement “can and often does interfere with a departing employee’s ability to get 
another job.”). 
 160.  Id. 
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misappropriating an employer’s trade secrets.161 To shore up this lack 
of protection, employers could utilize specific confidentiality 
agreements in their employee contracts designed to prohibit 
misappropriation of trade secrets.162 Employers could also rely on the 
limited non-compete agreement discussed below to provide the 
requisite amount of protection. 
Finally, non-solicitation agreements foster research and 
development more effectively than non-compete agreements. Many 
employers still adhere to the belief that non-compete agreements 
promote research and development by incentivizing employers to 
spend more on employee training “without fear that . . . competitors 
will poach knowledgeable employees.”163 But “[a] growing number 
of recent empirical studies on innovation and economic growth 
overwhelmingly suggest that the flow of people and information 
have significant positive effects, or spillovers, on markets.”164 This 
flow may “actually drive further innovation,”165 contrary to employer 
beliefs. Using non-solicitation agreements will encourage spillovers 
by allowing employees to freely move between employers, thus 
increasing research and development.  
B. Balancing the Use of Non-Compete Agreements  and  
Non-Solicitation Agreements to Create Strong Employer Protection 
with Minimal Risk 
Even in light of the new risks brought by the Act, non-compete 
agreements still have value for employers. They can narrowly tailor 
non-compete agreements to sufficiently protect employer interests 
that are not covered by non-solicitation agreements. The following 
 
 161.  See William G. Porter, II & Michael C. Griffaton, Identifying and Protecting 
Employers’ Interests in Trade Secrets and Proprietary Information, 68 DEF. COUNS. J. 439, 446 
(2001) (quoting Abraham Zion Corp. v. LeBow, 593 F. Supp. 551, 569 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) 
(“[A] former employee may not solicit the customers of his former employer if they would be 
unknown to the employee but for information obtained during his prior employment.”). 
 162.  See Mack, supra note 114, at 1211 (“A confidentiality agreement is ‘[a] promise 
not to disclose trade secrets or other proprietary information learned in the course of the 
parties’ relationship.’”). 
 163.  Nicandri, supra note 43, at 1013; see Petersen & Stelter, supra note 15. 
 164.  Amir & Lobel, supra note 57, at 856. 
 165.  Nicandri, supra note 43, at 1014. 
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discussion illustrates practical ways to protect these interests by using 
both agreements.  
1. Drafting narrowly tailored non-compete agreements 
Non-compete agreements may be used primarily to protect trade 
secrets, an interest that non-solicitation agreements do not protect as 
strongly as non-compete agreements. Employers can do four things 
to draft narrowly tailored non-compete agreements that are likely 
enforceable by Utah courts. 
First, employers should incorporate non-compete agreements 
only into the contracts of employees who actually come in contact 
with trade secrets. By doing this, employers will ensure that the 
unique interest that non-compete agreements protect—trade 
secrets—corresponds with the employees who have access to them. 
Limiting non-compete agreements to employees who utilize trade 
secrets will naturally limit the possibility that a court will determine a 
non-compete agreement unenforceable because fewer non-compete 
agreements will exist to declare unenforceable. 
Second, and more importantly, even if the agreement is 
adjudicated, a court will consider protecting trade secrets as a 
legitimate interest.166 In the non-compete agreement, employers can 
explicitly state that the purpose for their non-compete agreements is 
to protect trade secrets because only employees with access to trade 
secrets signed non-compete agreements.167 By spelling out “the 
legitimate business interest [an employer is] trying to protect,”168 
employers may avoid the possibility of a court determining that 
 
 166.  See Sys. Concepts, Inc. v. Dixon, 669 P.2d 421, 426 (Utah 1983) (“We hold that a 
covenant is valid which protects good will as well as trade secrets.”). 
 167.  However, employers should also be clear that the time restriction in the non-
compete agreement applies only to the former employee working for competitors. The 
proprietary information’s status as trade secrets should survive the termination of the non-
compete agreement; otherwise, the trade secrets may no longer be protected under any 
confidentiality or other agreements to that effect. See Julianne M. Hartzell, Time Limits in 
Confidentiality Agreements, INTELL. PROP. LITIG., Spring 2009, at 1. 
 168. Employers May Face New Challenges in Drafting Noncompetes, 19 UTAH EMP. L. 
LETTER, Oct. 2013, at 4, 6. 
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the  non-compete agreement has an illegitimate interest that 
is unenforceable.169 
Third, employers can restrict the agreement to a time limit that 
satisfies the Act and is also reasonable for their particular industries. 
The Act specifies only that non-compete agreements with temporal 
restrictions lasting longer than one year are unenforceable;170 it does 
not specify that temporal restrictions up to and including one year 
are automatically enforceable.171 While it is difficult to imagine a 
situation in which a less-than-one-year time restriction would be 
unreasonable, it is possible.172 Thus, employers should determine 
whether a one-year time restriction is reasonable under the 
circumstances. Generally, a time period that relates to the time it 
would take to adequately find and train a replacement is likely a 
reasonable restriction.173  
Finally, employers can restrict the geographic area of the non-
compete agreement to increase the reasonableness of the restriction. 
Restricting the area to either the geographic area for which the 
employee was responsible or the area in which the employee’s 
customers are mainly located will increase the reasonableness of the 
non-compete agreement’s geographic restriction.174 
2. Drafting aggressive non-solicitation agreements 
If an employer uses non-compete agreements primarily to 
protect trade secrets, the employer can then use non-solicitation 
agreements to protect employer goodwill and investment in 
employees, the two interests that both non-solicitation and non-
compete agreements protect.175 Besides attempting to comply with 
common law requirements, to draft effective, aggressive non-
 
 169.  For example, a primary purpose of restricting employee mobility would invalidate a 
non-compete agreement. See Robbins v. Finlay, 645 P.2d 623, 627 (Utah 1982). 
 170.  UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-51-201 (West Supp. 2017). 
 171.  See generally id. 
 172.  See Bryceland v. Northey, 772 P.2d 36, 40 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989) (opining that the 
time needed to replace an employee, in this case fourteen weeks, would be an appropriate time 
restriction in a restrictive covenant). 
 173.  Sill, supra note 118, at 376. 
 174.  Id. at 381. 
 175.  See supra Section IV.A. 
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solicitation agreements, employers should also keep three things 
in  mind. 
First, employers should create entirely separate non-solicitation 
agreements in their employment contracts. Non-solicitation and 
non-compete agreements are often combined into the same 
contractual provision because they are so similar.176 However, 
combining the two may present a challenge for a court if it must 
later determine whether it can separate the non-compete aspect of 
the provision for purposes of the Act. Thus, because separating the 
two agreements will avoid this problem, employers should 
consider  keeping the two agreements unconnected in their 
employment contracts. 
Second, employers should not leave the term “solicitation” 
undefined but should instead define the term broadly to encompass 
areas that a common standard dictionary definition of “solicit” 
might exclude. In contracts, as in other areas of law, undefined terms 
are generally given their ordinary and plain meaning.177 Therefore, if 
a non-solicitation agreement uses the term “solicit” and does not 
define it, a court could conclude that “solicit” means “to approach 
with a request or plea” and “to try to obtain by usually urgent 
requests or pleas.”178 Thus, the non-solicitation agreement might not 
provide any protection for the employer if, for example, a former 
employee recruits a third party and directs that party to target the 
employer’s customers since the employee is not the actual person 
doing the asking. “Solicit” should be well defined to encompass this 
and any other possibilities not covered by the ordinary meaning. 
Third, the agreement should include a favorable choice of venue 
provision that allows the employer to quickly access a courthouse to 
file an injunction against any former employees who violate the non-
 
 176.  See Gould, supra note 153, at 520. 
 177.  See Hi-Country Prop. Rights Grp. v. Emmer, 2013 UT 33, ¶ 18, 304 P.3d 851, 
855–56 (giving undefined statutory terms their ordinary meaning); Bear River Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Williams, 2006 UT App 500, ¶ 13, 153 P.3d 798, 801 (looking to ordinary and common 
meaning of undefined terms in an insurance policy); Salem City v. Farnsworth, 753 P.2d 514, 
515 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (giving “[u]ndefined words in a zoning ordinance . . . their plain 
and ordinary meaning”). 
 178.  Solicit, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
solicit (last visited Jan. 3, 2018). 
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solicitation agreement. For most companies, this means that the 
choice of venue will be the state where the company has its primary 
place of business. By including a favorable, close venue, employers 
can minimize the effects of any wayward past employee who does 
violate the non-solicitation agreement. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Companies have flourished in Utah for a variety of reasons, 
including favorable state corporation laws. However, the Post-
Employment Restrictions Act will likely injure Utah businesses who, 
in good faith, try to enforce non-compete agreements. By passing 
the Act, the legislature imposes automatic penalties on employers 
who try to enforce what could be considered reasonable non-
compete agreements but instead are held unreasonable through a 
confusing set of common law requirements. To minimize this risk 
while still protecting the employer’s interests that non-compete 
agreements are designed to protect, employers can forego aggressive 
non-compete agreements altogether. Instead, employers can draft 
narrowly tailored non-compete agreements in conjunction with 
aggressive non-solicitation agreements that are (1) separated from 
the non-compete agreements, (2) defined in their scope, and (3) 
drafted to provide for quick enforcement through favorable choice of 
venue provisions. Doing so will protect their interests and mitigate 
the risk of incurring automatic attorney’s fees. 
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